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BACK TO A FUTURE: REVERSING KEITH SIMPSON'S
DEATH SENTENCE AND MAKING PEACE WITH THE
VICTIM'S FAMILY THROUGH POST-CONVICTION
INVESTIGATION
John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Keith Simpson was arrested for the murder of Joe Harrison; in
2006, he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole in 2022. Between
those two events, Simpson was sentenced to death, had his death sentence
vacated by the post-conviction relief court, reached a plea agreement with the
victim's family and the new Solicitor, saw the agreement invalidated when the
Attorney General's office overrode the family and the Solicitor by appealing the
post-conviction court's decision, lost the lower court's decision to an appellate
reversal, and won a cross-appeal for a new trial.
You just never know. You don't know how a capital case will end, of
course, but more importantly, you don't know what facts will determine how it
ends. Even now, we-the authors, and post-conviction counsel for Simpsonwould be hard pressed to say which facts mattered the most. One reason for this
difficulty is that different facts seem to have mattered to the two different courts
that reviewed this case. The one thing we do know about Simpson v. State is that
investigationmattered. This is a lesson that most of the life stories in this volume
repeat, in one form or another, and it's a lesson that bears repetition. Indeed, in
the post-conviction setting, the likelihood of review by more than one courtalong with the possibility that different facts will matter to different courtsincreases the need for a truly comprehensive investigation, one that covers the
range of what might matter.
We think, moreover, there may be a second lesson in this case and our
belief in the importance of that lesson is the reason we chose Keith Simpson's
story. Here is the more speculative and subtle lesson: To be persuasive, postconviction mitigation stories often need a retelling of the client's life and a
retelling of the crime itself. Put differently, as much as possible, "life stories"
need to be both consistent and complete.
II. THE STORY THE JURY HEARD: A RACIALLY-MOTIVATED,
EXECUTION- STYLE MURDER
A. The State's Case
The State charged Keith Simpson, and his co-defendant, Loyal Stokes, with
robbing Harrison's Market in Enoree, South Carolina, murdering the store's
owner, Joe Harrison, and shooting a customer, Anthony Scott, who was standing

. Professors, Cornell Law School. Along with Russell Ghent, Esq., we served as post-conviction
counsel for Keith Simpson. We wish to thank Naomi Terr, Paula Swenson, Pierre Armand, and
Malcolm "Ty" Meeks, who were all Cornell Law School students at the time, for their many hours
of investigative work on the case.
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in the parking lot. According to the indictment, Simpson shot Harrison, and
Stokes shot Scott. Don Thompson, who had never tried a death penalty case, was
appointed to represent both Simpson and Stokes.' After the State decided to seek
the death penalty against Simpson-but not against Stokes-Thompson was
relieved of his representation of Stokes. Phil Sinclair was then appointed as
Simpson's second attorney.
Simpson's case was prosecuted by the Solicitor for the Sixth Judicial
Circuit, Holman Gossett. At the guilt-or-innocence phase, the State presented a
chilling and largely uncontradicted story: Simpson, motivated by racial hatred,
shot a kindly store owner execution-style, and then ran off with his victim's
money.
Russell Stevenson testified that he went with Simpson and Stokes on the
afternoon in question to visit a cousin, Jonell Geter.2 Geter testified that while
passing by the Harrison store, Simpson said that he was going to rob the store,
and that he "had not killed a white man today.",3 Geter and Stevenson both
testified that, shortly after Simpson
,
4and Stokes left, they heard shots coming from
the direction of Harrison's store.
Stevenson, however, said nothing about
Simpson's purported "white man" remark.
Several witnesses testified that Simpson entered the store while Stokes
remained outside. Anthony Scott was inside, making a purchase from Joe
Harrison; Scott finished his purchase and walked out. 5 Nathan Scott, Anthony
Scott's nine-year-old son, testified to hearing loud noises and coming to the front
of the store to investigate,6 at which point Simpson pointed the gun at him and
"clicked" it several times. Nathan said he hid behind the slot machines, came
out from behind them, and saw Simpson standing behind the cash register with
money in his hands.7 Nathan had said nothing in his pretrial written statement
about seeing Simpson with money, and on cross-examination, he stated that he
recalled seeing Simpson with the money after someone from the Solicitor's
Office "helped" him. To bolster the credibility of Nathan's trial testimony, the
State called Detective Rick Gregory, who said that he had interviewed Nathan
Scott prior to taking his written statement, and that at that time, the boy had
mentioned seeing money in Simpson's hands. 9 Gregory did not, however, have
any notes from this interview, or even notes documenting that any such interview
had occurred. 10 The only other evidence of robbery was the testimony of Willie
Rice, who testified that he had borrowed a twenty-dollar bill from Harrison not
long before Harrison was shot, and that he saw twenty-dollar bills in the cash

1Appendix at 2989, 2957-58, Simpson v. Moore, 627 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 2006) [hereinafter App.].

2

Id.at 1364.

3
1d. at
4

1347.
Id.at 1358, 1399.
5
Id.at 1128,1144.
6Id.at 1166-68.
7
Id.at 1170,1174.
'Id.
at 1186-87.
9Id.at 1456-57.
'°Id.at 1507-11.
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register at that time. 1 This detail was important because when the police arrived,
the cash register drawer was open, and there was money in each of the
compartments except the one for twenty-dollar bills. 12 Rice, however, like
Nathan Scott, had given a less helpful pretrial written statement that referred to
and made no mention at all of seeing twenty-dollar
borrowing "a couple dollars,"
3
bills in the cash register.1
David Rhodes, who was working in the stockroom, testified that he heard
14
shots, hid in the cooler, and saw Harrison walking towards the back of the store.
Rhodes said that when he opened the cooler, Harrison told him to call 911, then
turned, took several steps and collapsed.' 5 Anthony Scott testified that when he
heard the shots from outside the store, he jumped out of his pickup truck and
began running toward the front of the store. 16 Stokes then fired several times at
Scott, seriously wounding but not killing him.'7 Witnesses who had been sitting
outside, drinking, testified that Stokes began firing randomly toward them, but hit
no one,18 and others testified that Simpson aimed his gun at them.' 9
Medical examiner John Wren, M.D., testified to the results of his autopsy,
creating the most damaging picture of the death of Joe Harrison. According to
Dr. Wren, Harrison suffered three separate gunshot wounds. The first wound
was in Harrison's right palm, a "through-and-through" wound exiting through the
back of the hand. Dr. Wren testified that he saw no gunpowder or stippling on
the wound, and that the bullet hole was very circular, with no skin splitting, and
he therefore characterized the injury as a distant wound - one fired a minimum of
ten-to-fifteen inches away from the target. According to Dr. Wren, this hand
wound may have been inflicted while the hand was in a defensive position.2 °
Dr. Wren next discussed the second gunshot wound, which entered the
lower-right abdomen and lodged in Harrison's upper-right back. In Dr. Wren's
opinion, this injury was also a distant wound. Most damaging was his conclusion
that the nine defects found in Harrison's bunched-up blue jeans, combined with
the sharp upward trajectory of the bullet through Harrison's body, could only
mean one thing: The victim must have been lying down when he was shot.2' On
cross-examination, trial counsel posed alternative situations to explain the sharp

"Id. at 1086-87.
'2 Id. at 1068, 1447.
1Id. at 1106-07.
14 Id. at 1202-05.
at 1205.
'Id.
16 1d. at 1130-31.
'1Id. at 1135-38.
Id. at 1218, 1228.
'9 1d. at 1260-61, 1278.
20 Id. at 1654-55. On cross-examination, trial counsel compounded this damning testimony by
defining "defensive wound" for the jury, something the prosecution had ignored: "Defensive
wound is usually where someone holds out a hand and tries to block the effects of the gunshot?"
Id. at 1669. If the image of Simpson shooting the supplicant Harrison was not vivid enough from
Dr.
Wren's testimony, defense counsel's definition brought the picture into focus.
2
'Id. at 1661-62.
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bullet trajectory, but Dr. Wren dismissed these hypotheses, explaining that these
scenarios would have distorted the bullet, and no distortion was present.22
According to Dr. Wren, the third bullet also produced a distant wound of
"more than twelve to fifteen inches., 23 Despite trial counsel's knowledge that
Dr. Wren had "a reputation of being someone who would be favorable to the
State, 24 despite his client's account of what happened-that the first gunshots
went off during a struggle over the gun-and despite Harrison's tough
reputation, 25 counsel did not attempt to impeach Dr. Wren's testimony by calling
an independent forensic expert of any sort, or by using the statements of two
previous State witnesses to the effect that Harrison was standing when they heard
the gunshots.26
B. The Defendant's (Apparently) Bald-Faced Lies
Simpson's statements were introduced as part of the State's case-in-chief.
In his final statement, he admitted shooting Harrison, but denied taking money7
and maintained that Harrison was not lying down when the shots were fired.
Simpson testified in his own defense at trial, amplifying the story of his final
statement. He admitted spending time with Geter and Stevenson, but denied ever
talking about killing anyone, or saying anything about race.28
According to Simpson, he had planned to rob the store with Stokes, but as
he approached the counter where Harrison was waiting on Anthony Scott, he
both recognized Scott and realized that a child (Scott's son) was present. 29 He
"chickened out," and was attempting to get Stokes's attention through the
window to let him know that he was not going to do anything, when his gesturing
allowed Harrison to see the handle of his pistol. 30 Harrison grabbed for the gun,

22Id. at 1673.

" Id. at 1666.
24
Id. at 2967.
25
During preliminary investigations in Enoree, trial counsel Phil Sinclair interviewed an old school
friend who intimated, "Knowing Joe Harrison, it's possible that he could of [sic] tried to take the
gun." Id. at 3163.
26 In order for Dr. Wren's trial interpretation to jibe with Scott's and Rhodes's accounts, Simpson
would have had to shoot Harrison in the left buttock, knocking him to the floor. Then, during a
brief period when neither Scott nor Rhodes saw Harrison on the ground, Simpson would have had
to shoot Harrison as he lay on his back. Finally, after Simpson fled, Harrison would have had to
hop to his feet after receiving three bullet wounds and walk to the back of the store for help. As
unlikely as this scenario seemed, trial counsel did not confront Dr. Wren with these conflicts on
cross-examination.
27
App., supra 1, at 1495-97.
28 On cross-examination, Simpson maintained that when he and his friends first began talking about
committing a robbery, "[w]e wasn't talking about killing." Id. at 1745. He denied saying he would
kill Harrison and adamantly denied saying that he "hadn't killed me a white man today": "No, sir. I
was talking about robbing, but I never referred to killing anybody. I never referred to no particular
store, and I didn't refer to no color." Id. at 1746.
29Id. at 1719-20.
3
Id. at 1721, 1723.
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and during the struggle for it, the gun went off more than once. Simpson testified
that Harrison then broke away from the struggle, and ran out from behind the
counter.3 ' Simpson heard a sound behind him and turned to see the boy, Nathan,
standing behind him; he claimed he did not intend to point the gun at the child or
to shoot him, but admitted that he might have cocked the gun as he turned
around.32 Simpson then wheeled back around, saw Harrison still standing, and
fired two more shots, aiming at his legs to bring him down. Simpson maintained
that he fired the fatal shots while in the grip of fear and confusion set off by the
struggle and the initial shots, and claimed that he intended only to disable
Harrison so he could get away.33 He testified
3 4 that he ran out without taking
anything from the store, leaving empty-handed.
Trial counsel called no witnesses to support Simpson's account of the
homicide. Thus, the only evidence before the jury that contradicted the State's
theory of a racially-motivated, execution-style killing was Simpson's obviously
self-interested testimony. In closing, the prosecutor mocked Simpson's story of a
struggle and his denial that he took money. He began his closing argument by
telling the jury that Simpson's testimony had been "totally discredited by the
other witnesses in this trial and by his own testimony," and argued that what
Simpson said was inherently implausible:
He wants you to believe that fifty-eight year old Joe Harrison assaulted him.

That's what his testimony is ....His testimony..

.

is not worthy of belie[fJ.

Why? He has a bias. He's on trial for murder. And as the judge will tell
you, you have the ability to take into consideration
that he has a prior record
35
of a crime of moral turpitude or untruthfulness.
Next he argued that the physical evidence did not support Simpson's testimony,
emphasizing Dr. Wren's testimony that the wound to Harrison's hand was a
"distant wound., 36 Finally, he dismissed Simpson's testimony that the first shots
went off as he and Harrison were struggling over the gun. Rather than
struggling, the Solicitor told the jury, Harrison "stood there helpless and
defenseless"; "Harrison "wasn't just shot by accident, and he wasn't shot
in a
37
struggle [but] ...was shot three times as he tried to run, tried to get away.
Trial counsel argued that the evidence was more consistent with voluntary
manslaughter than with murder. 38 Using the gun and the jury-box rail as props,

31

1d. at 1721-22.
Id.at 1748-49.
33"When I shot that first shot, it was like he was like staggering or falling, and I shot again. But I
never intended to-I never intended to kill him or nothing .... I just wanted to shoot him like to
just make him fall, like try to shoot him in the leg and disable him ... just so I could get out of
there." Id.at 1721.
34"I left the beer and the money and the change.... Ijust ran. I was so scared." Id.
at 1723.
35
Id.at 1791-92. Simpson had testified that he had a prior conviction for larceny. Id.at 1690.
36Id. at 1807.
3"Id. at 1807.
3
Id.at 1831, 1839.
32
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Counsel attempted to demonstrate that Simpson's testimony was consistent with
the physical evidence of the victim's wounds.39 Counsel also disputed the State's
theory that Simpson shot Harrison while the latter lay on the floor, reminding the
jury that Dr. Wren "didn't say there was no possibility that the angles could
happen any other way. The coroner said 'most likely that's probably it, but I
can't tell you what angle these people were at.'4 0
With no forensic expert to corroborate even the possibility a struggle, and
no lay witnesses to impeach Geter's account of Simpson's racial animus, it was
not surprising that the jury convicted Simpson of robbery and capital murder.
C. Getting to Death
At the sentencing phase, the State maintained that Simpson came from a
loving home with every opportunity in the world available to him, but that he
chose to become a robber and murderer. Defense counsel offered no compelling
contrary evidence. Counsel did present three expert witnesses, but these
witnesses conducted the most cursory of evaluations and essentially testified that
there was not much mitigation present in Simpson's case. Mary Schultz, a social
worker, and the defense's only expert on Simpson's traumatic childhood, stated
that Simpson's main problem was that he lacked contact with his biological
parents. But trial counsel did not even ask Schultz to explain how this had
Schultz also unhelpfully observed that
affected Simpson's development.
Simpson's "work history has been sporadic," largely due to the fact that he
"would start a task, and then for no apparent reason he would leave it and come
back later.... You can't do that and hold down a job."'4 1 Dr. James Evans, a
clinical psychologist, generally characterized Simpson as "slow" and somewhat
prone to paranoia, schizophrenia, and mania. Dr. Evans reported that he had
tested Simpson for brain damage but that the test results were inconclusive. 2
Finally, Dr. Dafferlin Barnard-Dupree, a forensic psychiatrist, diagnosed
Simpson with dysthymic disorder (i.e., abnormal unhappiness) and alcohol/drug
dependence, but testified that most people who suffer from these illnesses
function normally. 43 The defense also presented several lay witnesses who
provided general "good guy" mitigation, but did not address the issue of his
racial attitudes or proclivity to violence, or in n, other way impeach Geter's
account of Simpson's desire to kill a "white man.
The jury sentenced Simpson to death.
D. Affirmance of the State's Story on Direct Appeal

39

Id. at 1837-38.

4°Id. at 1837 (internal quotation marks added).
41 Id. at 2093.
42
1d. at 2109.
43
1d. at 2120.
44Id.at 1997-2072.

HeinOnline -- 77 UMKC L. Rev. 968 2008-2009

2009]

BACK TO A FUTURE

From reading the direct appeal opinion, one would infer that there was no
contest at all over what happened in Harrison's store. The recitation of the facts
is limited to one sentence: "The victim was shot and killed during a robbery of
his convenience store. ' 4 None of the six issues raised in the appeal challenge
the State's basic narrative. 46 The State court found no merit in any of these
claims. With respect to the only claim even related to the evidence of
aggravation and mitigation presented, the opinion states only that the jury's
finding of aggravating circumstances was "supported by the evidence," and that
the death penalty "here is not' 7excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar capital cases. A
III. THE STORY THE POST-CONVICTION COURT - AND THE
VICTIM'S FAMILY - HEARD: A BOTCHED ROBBERY BY A
TRAGICALLY IMPAIRED DEFENDANT
By the time most cases reach post-conviction, the picture is clear, and it
does not reflect a charitable view of either the defendant or his crime. This is
almost a truism because if the story were either murky or mixed, it is unlikely
that a defendant would have been sentenced to death and that a death sentence
would have been affirmed. 48 For Keith Simpson, the sound-bite of the case as
the case went into post-conviction was particularly harsh: "Racist black
defendant robs store and shoots white storekeeper execution-style." Since it is
hard to imagine a court that wants to grant relief to a black racist execution-style
killer, this sound-bite, or snapshot of what the case was about, had to be changed.
As is well-recognized by practitioners, "changing the picture" or "changing
the sound-bite" is the primary task of post-conviction litigation.4 9 But what
dislodges the old sound-bite or snapshot? The answer in post-conviction must
start with what should have been the goal at trial: "[A] story... that is different
from, truer to, and more congruent with the known facts, and thus more
'
compelling, than the prosecution's.5O
According to narrative theory, trials are

45State v. Simpson, 479 S.E.2d 57, 59 (S.C. 1996).
46 The appellate court rejected claims that: 1) a venireperson was improperly excused; 2) Anthony

Scott's testimony that his son was hysterical after the shooting was improperly admitted; 3) a

mistrial should have been granted when the Solicitor improperly read into the record a witness's
statement that he was afraid that Simpson would come back and shoot him too; 4) the testimony of
the victim's wife and son concerning what kind of person he was and what impact his death had on
their family should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative; 5) the judge erred when
he refused to instruct the jury that if Simpson were not sentenced to death, he would be ineligible
for parole; and 6) that the death penalty was disproportionate to the crime. Id at 59-61.
41Id.at61.
48 See,

e.g., Mark E. Olive & Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary Guidelines for the
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams In Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picture in PostConviction, 36 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1067, 1067-68 (2008).
49See id.
at 1068.
50Id. For an early exploration of the role of narrative in the life of the law, see Anthony G.

Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINIcAL L. REv. 9 (1994). For Professor
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story battles, and in such battles, the party who can tell the most compelling
story, one that fits best with each individual juror's narrative, will emerge as the
winner.5' The problem for the post-conviction lawyer, of course, is that the
defendant's story has already been declared the loser - at least twice (at trial and
on direct appeal), and often three times (if certiorari has been sought and denied).
The only realistic prospect for winning the next story battle is to change the
facts for which each side's story must account. Thus, fact investigation is the
most crucial task of the post-conviction lawyer. This is not to say that legal
theories do not matter at all, but only to say that unless those theories provide a
vehicle to deliver a new story, they are unlikely to lead to relief.52
The reinvestigation of the facts of Simpson's case proved very productive.
The evidence presented at the post-conviction relief ("PCR") hearing suggested a
very different sound-bite: a sound-bite rendered persuasive by telling an
integrated story that both provided strong support for Simpson's account of the
crime, and accurately described Simpson's deficits through the presentation of a
In addition, post-conviction
wealth of compelling mitigation evidence.
investigation into the practices of the Solicitor's Office revealed strong evidence
that Solicitor Gossett was influenced by race in his decision to seek the death
penalty.
A. New Evidence Supporting Simpson's Account of the Crime
That Simpson shot and killed Harrison was never disputed, but whether he
did so in the course of a robbery was disputed, and, because robbery was the sole
aggravator submitted to the jury, was determinative of the question of whether he
Whether Simpson shot Harrison without
was guilty of capital murder.
provocation and then shot him again as Harrison lay incapacitated on the floor
was also disputed, and was highly relevant to whether he deserved the death
penalty. Similarly, whether he planned to kill a "white man" was both disputed
and significant in any death calculus. After an adequate investigation, substantial
evidence existed that: 1) cast doubt on whether money actually was taken; 2)
established that the homicide most likely occurred during a struggle over the gun;
Amsterdam's more recent work in this area, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW (2000). See also Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and
Narrative
Necessity in a CriminalCase, 47 STAN. L. REv. 39 (1994).
51
See John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative
Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1069,
1087-91 (2007) (reviewing literature on legal narratives).
52 There are exceptions, but these generally depend upon a small class of new, categorical legal
developments. Even in such cases, investigation is often necessary. Thus, for example, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which declares the death penalty for crimes committed by minors
to be unconstitutional, creates a new legal theory for exemption from imposition of the death
penalty and does not generally require new factual development; after Simmons, it was enough to
plead Simmons, and the generally undisputed, previously established fact of the defendant's status
as a minor at the time of the crime. Although there might be a few such post-conviction slam-dunk
cases under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which exempts persons with mental
retardation from execution, in general, despite the change in the governing rule, post-conviction
Atkins claims require substantial investigation.
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3) conclusively established that the victim was not shot when he was lying down;
and 4) rendered the racial remark extremely improbable. In short, the evidence
adduced at the PCR hearing strongly supported Simpson's account of the crime,
thereby lessening both the moral culpability of his actions and the consequent
legal liability for those actions.
1. Whether a Robbery Occurred
Simpson presented extensive evidence that no robbery occurred, most of
which was possessed by the State at the time of trial but not turned over to the
defense. First, Simpson introduced a memo written by Deputy Solicitor Trent
Pruett concerning whether the death penalty should be sought in Simpson's case.
That memo acknowledged that "no robbery (larceny) occurred. Nothing taken
from the store, 53 and was corroborated by Charles Henderson, a senior
investigator in the Solicitor's Office, who testified that he had heard either Pruett
or Solicitor Gossett say that "[t]hey had no evidence that the money had been
taken or money had even been asked for. 54
Why had the Solicitor's Office concluded that no robbery had occurred?
Notes from the Solicitor's file revealed that police found a bank bag with "a large
amount of money in [sic] behind the cash register, ' 55 suggesting that Harrison
may have transferred money from the register into the bag as the day went on,
which would explain the absence of any twenties in the cash-register drawer.
The notes also reported that the money was turned over to one of the victim's
brothers, and that no accounting to determine whether money was taken was
even attempted.56
Most importantly, Simpson introduced abundant evidence that Nathan
Scott's testimony - that he saw Simpson with the money in his hands - was
completely unreliable, and most likely the product of coaching by Chief
Investigator Johnny Dyer. Before trial, but after Nathan gave a written statement
that made absolutely no mention of seeing money taken, Dyer met alone with
Nathan at the boy's home,58 and then took him alone to the crime scene to
prepare his testimony,5 9 providing ample opportunity for either inadvertent or
deliberate suggestion. These sessions were never revealed to defense counsel.
Moreover, the variations in Nathan's account of the events in the store were also
kept from defense counsel; the prepared "Q and A" for Nathan from the

53

App., supra 1, at 4093.
1d. at 4472-74.
55Seventh Judicial Circuit's Solictor's Office, File 002433 [hereinafter Solicitor's File] (provided
to counsel pursuant to discovery request) (on file with author).
56
Id.at 02433; 02440. At the post-conviction relief hearing, Jack Harrison, brother of the victim
and co-owner of the store, confirmed that he and his brother kept a moneybag hidden behind the
counter, and that sometimes they would transfer money between the register and the bag. PCR Tr.
593-94.
58
App., supra 1, at 4019, 4021-22.
59
1d. 4023-24, 4026.
54
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Solicitor's file has a note at the top stating that the order of the events as Nathan
told it would shift.
Dyer denied that he asked Nathan suggestive questions, or tried to get him
to change his testimony, but after their meeting, the evidentiary obstacle reported
in Truett's memorandum ceased to be an issue; on the eve of trial,
Dyer wrote to
60
defense counsel informing him of the changes in Nathan's story.
In the same letter, Dyer told defense counsel that Willie Rice's testimony
would likewise change. 6' Dyer was also responsible for preparing Rice's
testimony, and the transformation of Rice's story is similarly suspicious. Rice
made an initial statement that seemed insignificant, and certainly provided no
basis for inferring that a robbery had occurred: He merely reported that he
borrowed "a couple of dollars" from Harrison shortly before the robbery. In his
trial testimony, however, he claimed that he borrowed twenty dollars, which he
saw Harrisonpeel off the top of a stack of twenties in the cash drawer. This
change in Rice's story was crucial because if he really saw twenty-dollar bills,
then it was reasonable to infer that Simpson took them. In addition to the
suspiciousness of Dyer's last-minute report that Rice would testify to the
presence of twenties, the Solicitor's file provided other evidence of tampering
with Rice's story; the draft "Q and A" for Rice contained no questions or answers
referring to twenties in the cash register.62 If indeed Rice had seen the twenties,
it is hard to imagine why that fact was not discovered before the "Q and A" was
prepared.
At the evidentiary hearing, Simpson also presented specific reasons to
doubt the integrity of Dyer. Six of Dyer's former colleagues-all former
assistant solicitors-testified that Dyer's reputation for truthfulness in the
Solicitor's Office was bad by the time of his involvement in the Simpson case,63
and several of them had heard rumors that Dyer tampered with Nathan Scott's
testimony.
Simpson also presented expert testimony concerning the unreliability of
Nathan Scott's testimony in his case. Trial counsel did not consult an expert on
child witnesses, but if they had done so, persuasive testimony demonstrating the
unreliability of Nathan's testimony could have been presented. Dr. Charles
Brainerd, a nationally recognized expert in human memory and developmental
psychology, first testified to the factors that made Nathan particularly susceptible
to suggestion. His age (nine at the time of the crime), his low IQ (70), his
learning disability, the presence of a weapon, the fact that he was hysterical
immediately after the crime, and the passing of more than a week before his first
recorded statement. All these factors would have interfered with his memory of
the crime and, therefore, made him more likely to fill in details he did not
remember. In addition, there were numerous factors about the interviewing

60 Letter from Johnny Dyer to Don Thompson (Aug. 30, 1994) (on file with authors).
61id.

Solicitor's File, supra note 55, at 02134.
63 App., supra 1, at 3335 (John Paul Abdalla); 3354 (Barry Joe Barnette); 4151 (Robin Clark File);
4489 (Charles Allen Henderson); 5487 (Jason Thomas Wall); 4534,4539-40 (Beverly Jones).
62
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situations that increased the likelihood that suggestive questioning occurred: The
questioners were not "blind," but had a large stake in producing the right
answers; there was no recording of what questions they asked; and Dyer took
Nathan to the scene of the crime and spoke to him without the presence of any
other person. Dr. Brainerd also examined Nathan's actual testimony and found a
number of indicators that details were in fact implanted in his memory: Several
highly improbable details, the appearance of additional facts as time went on
rather than the natural decay of memory,64 and the appearance of a large number
of discrepancies between accounts of what happened, particularly the shifting
sequence of events. Moreover, the fact that at trial, the Solicitor had to prompt
Nathan to talk about the money increases the likelihood that that memory was
false. Dr. Brainerd concluded that Nathan Scott's testimony was not reliable.65
2. Whether a Struggle Occurred
At trial, Dr. Wren testified that the victim's hand wounds were not the
result of a struggle for the gun, but were defensive injuries, and that Harrison was
shot execution-style while lying down on the floor. However, Dr. Wren recanted
this damning testimony in his 1999 deposition after confessing that he had not
actually taken the medical boards in forensic pathology at the time of Simpson's
trial.66 He then admitted he was wrong about the wound in Harrison's right hand;
the bullet hole was surrounded by gunpowder residue after all.67 With this new
discovery, Dr. Wren also re-categorized the hand injury as a loose-contact
wound, which indicated either a defensive position or a struggle, thereby belying
the trial68image of Harrison holding up his hands, trying in vain to protect
himself.
Dr. Wren also contradicted his trial testimony regarding how the second
bullet's trajectory through the lower right abdomen into the upper right back
might have occurred. At trial, Dr. Wren stated conclusively that the injury was a
distant wound and that the only plausible explanation for the bullet's sharp
upward angle was that Harrison must have been lying down. But during his
deposition, Dr. Wren submitted two likely alternatives to his trial depiction of

64 When asked about Detective Gregory's testimony to the effect that, prior to giving the written

statement in which he made no mention of seeing money taken, Nathan had said he saw the money,
Dr. Brainerd expressed the opinion that, had there been any record of the interview, it might have
added substantial weight to the credibility of Nathan's story. Given, however, that Gregory's log
did not reflect that he had even seen Nathan on the day he claimed to have heard about the money,
that he made no notes of the conversation, and how tired he would have been after being up the
night before (as his log did reflect), Dr. Brainerd also doubted the reliability of Gregory's
of that conversation.
recollection
65
App., supra 1, at 3151.
66Id. at 3252.
67Id. at 3264.
68id. at 3268.
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Simpson mercilessly shooting the prone victim, both of which were consistent
with the struggle Simpson described.69
The PCR hearing demonstrated that it would have been easy to obtain
experts to inform counsel's questioning of Dr. Wren and to corroborate
Simpson's version of what had happened at the Harrison store. In part, Dr. Wren
had relied upon the nine defects found in Harrison's bunched-up blue jeans,
combined with the sharp upward trajectory of the bullet through Harrison's body,
to conclude that Harrison must have been lying down when he was shot. Jeff
Hollifield, an expert in trace metals and residue, tested the holes in Harrison's
pants for traces of copper or lead residue. He found no "indication of lead
residue or copper residue or any gun powder flakes or metal fragments or primer
material around any of those particular holes., 70 Based on these test results,
Hollifield concluded that the pant defects were not bullet holes at all, thereby
contradicting Dr. Wren's statement at trial that the nine defects in Harrison's
pants indicated that Simpson shot Harrison while he was lying down. Hollifield
offered further support for Simpson's statement that he aimed the second shot
down at the counter. Investigators found a bottle opener on the store countertop
that was covered with assorted nicks and cuts, as well as a semicircular
impression at one end. According to Hollifield, the diameter of the impression
measured 9.5 millimeters, the same diameter as a .38 caliber bullet. 7' Hollifield
also detected trace amounts of copper on the bottle opener, which would indicate
that a copper-jacketed bullet had struck the opener.72
Wayne Hill, an expert in homicide reconstruction events and firearms, also
supported Simpson's story of a physical struggle for the gun. Based on his
review of trial transcripts, law enforcement reports, autopsy reports, and crime
scene photographs, Hill believed that the first two gunshots occurred during a
struggle for the gun. 73 Hill found that the presence of gunpowder residue around
the wound and fingertips of the right hand, without stippling, "would be
consistent with having your hand around the [gun] barrel," as would occur in a
struggle.74 Hill also found it most likely that the same bullet went through
Harrison's right hand and into his lower-right abdomen before lodging in his
upper-right back.
Hill next undermined the State's argument that discharging a double-action
firearm, such as a .38 revolver, would "require.. . a conscious effort on the part
of the shooter., 75 Rather, two people struggling over a weapon could
"absolutely" generate the trigger pull necessary to discharge the firearm. 76 If
Harrison leaned over the counter and attempted to snatch the gun away from
Simpson, it is "probably a safe estimate" that he would "pull on that gun with

69Id.at 3289-90.
7
°1d.at 2804.

71Id.at 2807.
72

id.

71Id.at 2826.
74Id.
71Id.at 1608.
76
Id.at 2832.
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13 'pounds." 7 7 In addition, when Harrison grabbed the gun, Simpson's likely
reaction would be to tense his entire hand. Thus, the combination of Harrison's
grab and Simpson's retraction would easily produce enough trigger pull.7"
Hill's examination of the evidence also supported Simpson's assertion that
he had aimed the second gunshot downwards, and the bullet deflected off the
countertop. Like Hollifield, Hill found the opener contained an area "exactly like
bullet impacts., 79 The damage to the countertop and bottle opener suggested a
resulting "badly mangled bullet," and police had discovered just such a bullet
near the front door of the store.8 0
Finally, Hill's expert testimony also corroborated Simpson's account of the
third and fourth gunshots, which occurred as Harrison walked upright from
behind the counter. According to Hill's analysis of Harrison's blood stains and
blood flow, Harrison must have been standing upright when Simpson shot him.8 '
Hill also concurred with Hollifield that the probability of a bullet causing nine
semi-holes in the folds of Harrison's pant leg without causing any abrasion to
Harrison's actual leg was infinitesimal. 2 Hill concluded that the clothing defects
found by Dr. Wren must have been pre-existing, further discrediting Dr. Wren's
opinion that these pant holes indicated Harrison's prone position. 3
Lastly, Dr. Steven Dunton, an expert in forensic pathology, agreed that the
physical evidence was strongly indicative of a struggle. The "obvious"
gunpowder concentration around the bullet hole in Harrison's right hand, coupled
with the faded residue in other parts of the palm, "is quite suggestive of a loose
contact wound in a hand that has been cuffed in some fashion." 4 Specifically,
Dr. Dunton believed that the Harrison's hand was cuffed over the barrel of the
gun when it discharged; his right hand wound "would be typical" of a struggle
over a gun.8 5 Furthermore, Dr. Dunton concurred with Hill that the angle of the
right abdomen wound indicated a struggle.8 6 According to Dunton, the abrasion
on Harrison's left abdomen also supported Simpson's account of a struggle,
because this superficial injury was likely caused by Harrison's forceful contact
with a firm surface area, such as the contact which would occur when two men
try to drag one another over a counter.8 7 Dr. Dunton concluded that "the most
consistent scenario ...
front ....,,88

is that [the victim] was shot standing upright from the

77

Id.at 2833.

78

1d.

79

Id. at 2837.
"I1d. at 2839.
8
8lId. at 2842.
Id.at 2845-46.
83
1Id. at 2846.
4Id.at 2875.
85
Id.at 2876.
6
1 Id.at 2880.
87

1d.at 2879.
1Id. at 2884.

88
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Thus, Dr. Wren's revised opinion concurred with that of Simpson's three
experts: Simpson's story of a struggle for the gun was consistent with the
physical evidence, and the State's contention that Simpson shot the victim when
he was lying on the floor trying to shield himself from the bullet was utterly
inconsistent with that evidence.
3. Whether Simpson Acted out of Racial Animus
Jonell Geter testified at trial that shortly before the incident at Harrison's
store, Simpson was talking of "kill[ing] a white man." The impact of that
testimony, however, would have been greatly blunted had the jury been aware of
Geter's motivation to lie and Simpson's racial attitudes: as was revealed in postconviction proceedings, the State withheld evidence of the former, and defense
counsel failed to develop available evidence of the latter.
At the PCR hearing, Simpson introduced a witness information sheet from
the State's files showing that Geter ran a "crack house." 89 This information
could have been used to impeach the credibility of Geter by suggesting a motive
to lie: the need to maintain a good relationship with law enforcement. Geter's
credibility could have been further undermined had counsel investigated
Simpson's racial attitudes. As the PCR hearing affidavits demonstrated, trial
counsel could have marched out an army of character witnesses who would have
testified that Simpson grew up in a non-racist home, never uttered a racist
comment, harbored no prejudice against white people, and surrounded himself
with both black and white friends. 90 Furthermore, these same people would have
testified that Simpson was not a violent person.91 All of his friends and family
agreed that Simpson's arrest was shocking and that he generally responded
peacefully to situations that would provoke most men to violence.92 These
accounts are hardly consistent with a man who boasts about his plans to "kill[]..
a white man...."
B. New Evidence of Simpson's Impairments and How They Affected His
Behavior at the Crime Scene
In addition to presenting a less aggravated picture of the crime itself, the
PCR hearing created a more accurate-and sympathetic-picture of the man who
committed it.

"Id. (Dyer

Dep. Ex. 7).

90 Id. at 5529 (Anderson Aft.

5); 5538 (Geter Aft.

4); 5543 (Harris Aff.

5); 5545 (McDaniel

Aff. 6); 5551 (Pulley Aft. 5); 5552 (Richardson Aff. 5); 5556 (Spurgeon Aft. T 5); 5554
(Simpson Aft. 3); 5559 (M. Sullivan Aft. 5).
91
See, e.g., App. at 5529 (Anderson Aft 6).
92
Id.at 5529 (Anderson Aff. 6); 5538 (Geter Aft. T 5); 5539 (Golson Aft. 6); Harris Aft. It 4,
6; 5545 (McDaniel Aft. 5, 7); 5551 (Pulley Aft. 4); 5552 (Richardson Aft. T 4, 7); 5556
(Spurgeon Aft. 79 4, 6); 5554 (Simpson Aff. TT 2, 4); 5558 (D. Sullivan Aft. 5); 5560 (M.
Sullivan Aft. 6).
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1. Childhood Neglect and Deprivation

Dr. Bowers-Andrews, an expert in childhood neglect and deprivation,
began by describing the tragic circumstances into which Keith Simpson was
born. His grandfather forced his young mother, Pearl Simpson, to have sex with
him and a friend. She became pregnant with her father's child, a baby that died
shortly after birth. Soon thereafter, Pearl became addicted to alcohol and heroin,
and became a prostitute to support her habits. Pearl's short-term relationship
with a substance-abusing older man produced Simpson.
Thus, the prenatal deck was stacked against Simpson. As Dr. BowersAndrews testified, a mother's heroin addiction during pregnancy can have
devastating effects on a fetus's long-term brain development. Heroin addiction
affects the fetus's self-regulation, and the eventual ability to regulate both his
biological functions and his social behavior.93 Infants who are exposed to heroin
in the womb are much more likely to be hyperactive and have Attention-Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder.94 Moreover, Simpson was subject to two other
intrauterine traumas: chronic alcoholic exposure and his mother's unsuccessful
attempt to abort him.95
Motherhood did not change Pearl's alcoholism, drug abuse, or prostitution.
As Dr. Bowers-Andrews testified, the first two to three years of a child's life "are
an absolutely critical phase. The brain grows more rapidly in the first two to
three years of life than ever again .... So the earliest experiences in life are very
critical to shaping who a person is." 96 Pearl's dissolute lifestyle resulted in
Simpson being left alone for long periods; eventually he was "found abandoned.
. . in a completely saturated crib, and was covered
in blisters and welts from
97
having been left alone, and was extremely hungry.,
According to Dr. Bowers-Andrews, the long-term effects of Pearl's
addictions and prostitution made her psychologically unavailable to her son. 98
Thus, Simpson spent the first eighteen months of his life physically and
emotionally neglected to the point where he nearly died. The insecure
attachment experienced by Simpson in his infancy was intensified when he was
sent to live with his aunt at eighteen months, and then uprooted again only four
months later and sent to live in South Carolina with his great-grandparents. As
Dr. Bowers-Andrews explained, such disrupted attachment generally yields
emotional disorders later in life, such as severe anxiety, depression, and a strong
tendency towards Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.99
In the second phase of her social-history assessment, Dr. Bowers-Andrews
chronicled the inadequate care-giving Simpson received growing up in his greatgrandparents' home in Gray Court, South Carolina. Although his great93

App., supra 1, at 2684.

94 Id. at 2686.
95

96

id.
Id. at 2687.

97

Id. at 2686.
Id. at 2689.
99
Id. at 2688-89.
9
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grandparents were loving, by the time he was a teenager, they were both over
eighty years old. Consequently, they were unable to adequately protect and
supervise him.' ° Dr. Bowers-Andrews explained that these shortcomings were
the root cause of many disturbing events Simpson experienced as a child. Most
importantly, an older male cousin repeatedly sexually assaulted Simpson between
the ages of six and nine, and Simpson was unable to tell his great-grandparents
about that abuse.' 0 ' Similarly, Simpson encountered enormous difficulties in
school, failing courses every year despite diligent attendance, but his greatgrandparents got him no help. Simpson also witnessed an unusual amount of
02
graphic violence as a child, twice observing a man murdered before his eyes.'
Simpson's traumatic childhood was worsened by his constant shuttling back and
forth between South Carolina and New York. 0 3 According to Dr. BowersAndrews, as a result of Simpson's feelings of inadequacy and vulnerabilit,° he
turned to drugs to relieve his anxiety when he was only about ten or eleven.'
The third phase of Dr. Bowers-Andrews' assessment focused on the poorly
resolved trauma and related disorders experienced by Simpson. Dr. BowersAndrews found it laudable that, burdened as he was with numerous social
05
impairments prior to adulthood, Simpson "cope[d] as well as he did."'
Simpson's downward spiral began with a horrific car accident in 1988, when he
saw one of his friends impaled, spoke to him in the wreckage before he died, and
saw the top of another friend's head sheared off. ' 6
Simpson was never the same person after this experience. According to Dr.
Bowers-Andrews, he was obsessed with the accident, talked about it incessantly,
and slept little. Not only did he exhibit clear symptoms of survivor guilt, but he
also developed depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and began drinking
heavily. 0 7 Dr. Bowers-Andrews noted that Simpson experienced anniversary
trauma following the accident;10 8 his depression, anxiety, and substance abuse
became heightened each year around August 28th. Thus, prior to shooting
Harrison on September 4, 1993, Simpson "was having a heavy drinking and drug
binge because of the anniversary date."'10 9

'Id. at 2695.
101Id

'°2Id. at 2696-97.
1031d. at 2697.
4Id at 2696.
'05 1d at 2726.
"06 Id. at 2701.
108

Dr. Bowers-Andrews defined "anniversary trauma" as an event which "occurs when there's the

time of year that might trigger a memory of a traumatic event, and... other circumstances will
often ... cause an acute intrusion of the emotions that are traumatic that are affiliated with the
events." Id. at 2728.
0'9Id. at 2729.
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2. Brain Damage

Dr. Gerald Kragh, an expert in neurology, testified to Simpson's brain
damage, the numerous causes of his impairment, as well as the destructive impact
the neurological impairment had on Simpson's conduct.I 0 Dr. Kragh diagnosed
Simpson with encephalopathy, or "abnormal brain." Specifically, Simpson's
brain
neurological impairment encompassed the bi-frontal lobe,' 'and though1 his
2
had been abnormal at least since childhood, its condition had worsened.'
Dr. Kragh's observation of paranoia, tangential speech patterns,
perseveration, headaches, and hyperactivity, were all consistent with the
abnormal bi-frontal lobe apparent from Simpson's medical history and during his
physical exam.'13 For the final portion of his evaluation, Dr. Kragh administered
an electroencephalogram ("EEG") and a quantitative EEG ("QEEG"), which
across both hemispheres of the frontal lobe of Simpson's
revealed
14 damage
brain.'
The social history performed by Dr. Bowers-Andrews allowed Dr. Kragh to
explain the multiple levels of Simpson's impairment: Genetic predisposition,
prenatal exposure to heroin, and an abuse-ridden infancy caused the original
abnormal bi-frontal lobe development, and that impairment was compounded by
Simpson's eight or nine significant childhood head injuries." 5 Moreover,
Simpson's sustained substance abuse worsened his already abnormal brain. As
Dr. Kragh explained, prolonged drug use affects the right frontal lobe much like
a sharp blow to the head; drugs destabilize a person's ability to make a rational
decision." 6 Predictably, extended substance abuse often results in individuals
who "make unbelievable decisions .... get
' 17into arguments . . . , get into fights
that were never planned, never anticipated." "
According to Dr. Kragh, Simpson was left with a severely limited capacity
to reason and an inclination "towards disinhibition, impulsive behavior,
emotional inability, poor judgment and ... lack of social restraints.' 18 Finally,
Dr. Kragh explained that the use of alcohol or drugs depresses the self-control
naturally exercised by the frontal lobe, and in someone like Simpson, who
struggled to develop a learned form of this social restraint, the alcohol and drug
consumption he engaged in on September 4, 1993, would result in a "reversal of
the normal behavior that has been painfully developed."' "19

"0Id. at 2739.
'"Dr. Kragh explained that this section of the brain includes the area behind the forehead, above
l
the eyes, and stretching "interhemispherically" across the left and right side of the brain. Id.
"'Id at 2753, 2785.
1l3Id. at 2749, 2754.
" 41d. at 2759-61.
"'Id. at 2772.
161d.at 2747.
lId. at 2748.
"8 ld. at 2761.
"9Id at 2762.
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3. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Dr. George Cogar, an expert in clinical psychology with a special emphasis
in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), testified to the results of his
psychological evaluation of Simpson. According to Dr. Cogar, Simpson suffered
from a chronic, delayed, and severe case of PTSD.' 20 The DSM-IV specifies
certain alternative diagnostic criteria for PTSD, and Dr. Cogar found that
Simpson suffered from virtually every symptom on the list.
Dr. Cogar first noted that Simpson was highly prone to develop PTSD even
before he experienced any trauma. As Dr. Cogar explained, there are four major
life situations which predispose an individual to PTSD: exposure to trauma in
utero, a childhood spent in a deprived socio-economic environment, the
experience of neglect in the formative years, and the sustaining of repeated
physical injuries. Simpson had experienced all four. 21 Moreover, Simpson
experienced a number of traumas-the 1988 car accident, falling out of a bus,
falling off a moped, and witnessing numerous violent incidents-that could serve
as a triggering event. Worst of all, however, was the sexual abuse Simpson
suffered, "one of the most damaging occurrences that can happen to a human
being."' 122 When anal rapes are repeated, the effects are "multiplicative and...
are worse again ... when it involves a child . .,,12'
Thus, the repeated rapes
left Simpson particularly vulnerable when later traumas occurred, such as the
1988 car accident. Dr. Cogar further testified that Simpson exhibited more than
enough horror and fear regarding 124all of the above-listed instances of trauma to
fulfill the first criterion for PTSD.
The second criterion in the DSM-IV definition of PTSD requires that the
individual persistently re-experience the traumatic event in at least one of five
ways; Simpson exhibited allfive possible manifestations of reexperience1 25 The
third criterion requires that the individual persistently avoid stimuli associated
with the trauma, and exhibit a numbing of general responsiveness in at least three
126
of seven ways; Dr. Cogar found that he exhibited all seven possible symptoms.
The fourth criterion requires that an individual must also persistently demonstrate
at least two symptoms of increased arousal not present before the trauma;
Simpson displayed all five possible symptoms. The fifth criterion, that the
above-mentioned symptoms occur for more than one month, was easily
satisfied. 127 The last criterion is that symptoms must cause clinically significant
distress in social, occupational, and other important areas of functioning, and
according to Dr. Cogar, Simpson experienced extraordinary distress throughout
120

Id. at 3021. Dr. Cogar defined PTSD loosely as "an anxiety disorder" caused by exposure to a
traumatic event. Id. at 3022.
121Id.
122 Id.
121 Id.
124Id.

at 3025.
at 3033.
at 3034.
at 3024.

1251Id. at 3028.

126 Id. at 3034.
121Id. at 3039.
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his life, and severe impairment across all spectrums of human functioning. Thus,
Simpson's PTSD was neither "mild," nor in doubt, as Dr. Barnard-Dupree
testified at trial. Rather, it was chronic and severe.
Dr. Cogar also diagnosed a corollary condition, anniversary trauma. During
the weeks surrounding the anniversaries of the 1988 car accident, Simpson would
become "irritable, more agitated. He would start drinking more, start using more
marijuana." In 1993, his anniversary trauma took the form of a week-long
alcohol and drug binge which encompassed the homicide with which he was
charged. 128
In addition to diagnosing PTSD and anniversary trauma, Dr. Cogar, like Dr.
Kragh, determined that Simpson suffered from brain damage. Dr. Cogar
explained how the combination of PTSD, anniversary trauma, and brain damage
tragically culminated in the September 4, 1993, homicide. According to Dr.
Cogar, the PTSD and brain damage significantly reduced Simpson's ability to
cope, and with such a diminished coping mechanism, Simpson became anxious
and rash. 129 Dr. Cogar emphasized that stressful situations, such as a struggle in
a convenience store, would bring these harmful traits to the fore: "when [PTSD
victims] are placed in situations which require good judgment, when they're
under stress, when snap decisions that need to be prudent must be made,
frequently they come up very short. And they act in impulsive ways .... ,13 0 In
Dr. Cogar's opinion, Simpson's completely nonviolent history confirmed his
theory that the homicide was the product of a lifetime of trauma internally
eroding a man into a tense, imprudent shell: "What we have is an ineffectual
individual who was beset by severe trauma, who coped as well as he could with
the limited assets that he was given by God, and had to function in13 1an
environment where from before birth, he was disadvantaged and maltreated."'
As Dr. Cogar's PCR hearing testimony demonstrated, an expert with
adequate information about Simpson's history would have been able to
conclusively and confidently diagnose PTSD. Trial counsel failed to provide
their forensic psychiatry expert, Dr. Barnard-Dupree, with information about
virtually any of the significant traumas in Simpson's history. Consequently,
though she suspected PTSD, she could not diagnose it. 132 In post-conviction
proceedings, however, Dr. Barnard-Dupree stated that, given the information
provided by33post-conviction counsel, her previous non-diagnosis of PTSD was
unreliable.

Thus, without attempting to excuse Simpson's initial decision to rob the
store, the PCR testimony of Drs. Bowers-Andrews, Kragh, and Cogar, along with

128 1d. at 3041.
129 Id. at
0

3044.

131d. at 3045.
131 Id. at

3047. Dr. Cogar easily distinguished Simpson from individuals who possess Antisocial

Personality Disorder. Simpson was no "thug"; he had a sterling attendance record in school,

always tried to maintain employment, and was well-liked by his community. Id. at 3046. Rather,
he was often the victim of thugs. Id.
32
' Id. at 5536-37 (Bamard-Dupree Af. M6-8).
3
11 Id. at 5536 (Bamard-Dupree Aff.
6).
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the affidavit of Dr. Barnard-Dupree, made clear that Simpson's decisions were
not fully culpable, and that his judgment and reactions while in the store were not
those of a normal person, but were triply impaired by brain damage, a history of
extreme abuse and neglect, and PTSD.
C. Evidence of Racial Motivation in the Decision to Seek the Death Penalty
Professor Theodore Eisenberg, an expert in applying statistical reasoning to
studies of the legal system, testified to the results of a statistical study of
decisions to seek the death penalty in the Seventh Judicial Circuit. Under
Professor Eisenberg's direction, data was gathered from court files on all the
homicide cases in the Seventh Judicial Circuit from 1977 to 1993, the year of
Simpson's offense. 134 He then compiled information for each case about the race
of the defendant, the race of the victim, the presence of aggravating factors that
would render the
crime death-eligible, and whether a notice of intent to seek
135
death was filed.
With respect to the race of the defendant, Professor Eisenberg found no
statistically significant effect, but with respect to the race of the victim, he found
a "very strong" statistically significant effect. 3 6 For the period between 1977
and 1993, he found that the Solicitor sought death in half of the fifty-two deatheligible white-victim cases but in none of the nineteen death-eligible black-victim
cases; such a result would occur by chance about four times in one hundred
thousand. 137 Eisenberg also isolated the cases from 1985 to 1993, the period
during which Holman Gossett was solicitor, and found that Gossett decided to
seek death in forty-three percent of the death-eligible white-victim cases but in
none of the black-victim cases. This result, he testified, would occur only six
times in ten thousand as a matter of chance. 138 Moreover, the defendant-victim
combination most likely to result in the
39 decision to seek the death penalty was a
black-defendant/white-victim pairing. 1
Because Simpson's case involved armed robbery, Eisenberg isolated armed
robbery cases, and found that the propensity to seek death in white-victim cases
was also very pronounced in this subset. Over the longer period, 1977 to 1993,
the resulting disparity would occur by chance only in eight out of one thousand
cases; over the period of Gossett's tenure as solicitor,
1 40 the disparity would occur
by chance alone only once out of one hundred times.
Professor Eisenberg also considered whether the age of the defendant might
differ in the black- and white-victim cases, thereby providing an alternative

134 Id.

at 2912-13. Professor Eisenberg cross-checked the completeness of those data against the

FBI Uniform Crime Reports and concluded that the research performed by his assistant was
"incredibly
thorough." Id. at 2913.
135 1d. at 2913-14.
136Id. at 2915.
131Id. at 2915-16.
118ld. at 2916.
139 Id. at 2919-20.
'4Id.at 2922-23.
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explanation. It did not.' 41 He acknowledged that he lacked information about the
presence of other mitigating factors, but stated that the absence of such data did
not raise any doubt in his mind regarding his conclusions. Professor Eisenberg
explained that this confidence was due in part to the fact that he had read
Gossett's deposition, in which Gossett stated that he could not recall a case in
which the presence of a mitigating factor led to a decision not to issue a notice of
intent to seek death. 142 Professor Eisenberg further observed that he also thought
it was implausible that mitigating factors would be systematically different in
black-victim and white-victim cases, noting in particular the presence of
mitigating factors in Simpson's case. 14 3 After considering all of the data,
Professor Eisenberg concluded that the race of the victim "plays a significant role
in the decision to issue a notice of intent to seek death" in the Seventh Judicial
Circuit. '"
D. The PCR Court's Response to the New Evidence
After hearing all of this evidence - some that changed the picture of the
crime, some that changed the picture of the criminal, and some that changed the
picture of the prosecution - the PCR court issued a decision focused solely upon
the new mitigation evidence. It granted relief upon an ineffective assistance of
counsel in sentencing claim after determining that "a substantial wealth of
information was neither available for the jury's review nor for a proper
presentation by [Simpson's] experts."' 145 According to the court, the missing
social, medical, and family history "was necessary to make Dr. Barnard-Dupree's
assessment and testimony complete," and the jury "was presented with only the
tip of the iceberg."' 46 Consequently, the jury was "not equipped with all the
tools it needed to make a fair and reasoned decision as to whether there existed
mitigating circumstances ...which would have warranted a sentence of life...
.,,147
Simpson was therefore entitled to a new capital sentencing proceeding
where a jury would get a full picture of the available mitigation.
The receptivity to mitigation evidence reflected in this opinion is
particularly noteworthy given its author. John C. Hayes, III, is a conservative
South Carolina judge. He was a prosecutor and member of the state legislature
before he was a judge, and after taking the bench, had been
the trial judge in a
148
number of capital cases which resulted in death sentences.
On the other hand, the PCR court's opinion denied all of the claims based
upon the new evidence uncovered about the crime itself. Interestingly enough, it

'4'Id. at

142ld

2924-25.
at 2925.

143id.

'44
Id.at 2927.
145 Id. at 5730.

'46Id. at 5729.

1471Id.at 5730.
148
See State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 2004); State v. Shafer, 573 S.E.2d 796 (S.C. 2002);

State v. Hughes, 521 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. 1999); State v. Fomey, 468 S.E.2d 641 (S.C. 1996).
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did not do so because it found the evidence unpersuasive. Instead, with respect
to counsel's failure to uncover evidence that would have supported his client's
account of the crime, the court determined that counsel's own demonstration
during closing argument was good enough:
While there is no question but that presentation of expert testimony by
experts such as Jeff Hollifield, Wayne Hill, and Dr. Steve Dunton could have
given trial defense counsel more to argue in support of Simpson's position,
there is also little either factually or theoretically added by the experts. These
experts offer opinions consistent with Simpson's position and, in the abstract,
their opinions confirm Simpson's position. However, it appears to the court,
trial counsel's presentation149at trial parallels any argument and theory now
available from the experts.
The court was more critical of the prosecution's failure to turn over
exculpatory evidence concerning whether money had been taken:
[The State's delivery of the money, bank bag, and wallet to Harrison's
brother] clearly constitutes sloppy police work in an armed robbery
investigation and could be considered a tainting of the scene. Clearly the
contents of the bag could have been exculpatory. Clearly this evidence
should have
been preserved and, thus, been subject to discovery by
50
Applicant.1

But instead of deciding whether Simpson was entitled to relief based on this
Brady violation, the PCR court declared, "this issue has not been presented to the
court [with sufficient specificity in the application for post-conviction relief] and,
therefore, cannot be addressed."' 5' As to the suppression of evidence that Geter
ran a crack house, although the PCR court held that the State had been dutybound to provide that evidence to defense counsel, it denied relief on the basis of
this Brady violation because trial counsel "thoroughly cross-examined" Geter
about his drug involvement and because "[t]he 'crack house' allegation was
bottomed purely on 'rumor.' 15 2 The PCR court also declined to grant relief
based upon the evidence of racial disparity in seeking the death penalty though
like its decision with respect to the new crime scene evidence, not because it
deemed the evidence unpersuasive. Rather, it found that counsel was not
ineffective in failing to challenge Solicitor Gossett's decision to seek the death
penalty as racially motivated because counsel made a strategic decision not to do
so. With respect to the underlying merits of the racial discrimination claim, the
lower court viewed the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v.
Aiken' 53 as controlling, despite the fact that the statistics relating to Solicitor

149 App., supra 1, at 5696.

"0 Id. at 5703 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419
(1995)).
..
Id. at 5704.
112 1d. at 5726.
i' 315 S.E.2d 110 (S.C. 1984).
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Gossett-who had never sought the death penalty in a black-victim case-were
far starker than the state-wide statistics presented in Thompson.
E. The Victim's Family's Response
Representatives of the victim's family, including Joe Harrison's wife and
brother, were present for the entire post-conviction relief hearing. Mindful of the
importance of victim outreach,154 as well as (we hope) sensitive to the human
tragedy of the death of Joe Harrison, we introduced ourselves to the victim's wife
shortly after the start of the hearing. Our conversation then was short, but her
reaction was not hostile. Then, before calling the pathologist, Dr. Dunton, one of
us (John) went to the family to tell them that Dr. Dunton would be talking about
the crime itself, and would show photos of the injury and the autopsy, explaining
the reason for this testimony but also expressing concern lest they be taken by
surprise. Although they said little, they seemed appreciative. Perhaps that made
some difference in their attitudes toward us, and by proxy, toward Keith
Simpson.
In any event, after the PCR court filed an order granting Simpson a new
sentencing trial, but denying post-conviction relief with respect to the
convictions, and denying motions for reconsideration from both sides, Simpson's
counsel approached the new Solicitor of the Seventh Judicial Circuit seeking
settlement. The Solicitor contacted the victim's family, determined that they
were receptive to a settlement, and thereafter entered into an agreement with
Simpson under which Simpson agreed to waive the time he had served, and be
re-sentenced to twenty years to life. Re-sentencing pursuant to that agreement
was scheduled to occur on Friday, October 4, 2002.
Despite the entire victim's family's affirmation, in the presence of
representatives of the Attorney General's Office, that they desired an end to the
litigation, on Wednesday, October 2, 2002, the Attorney General's Office filed a
Notice of Appeal. Simpson then filed a notice of cross-appeal, but he also moved
the PCR court to lift the stay created by the Notice of Appeal; the lower court,
with obvious reluctance, denied that motion. 5

154 See,

e.g., Mickell Branhan & Richard Burr, UnderstandingDefense-Initiated Victim Outreach
and
Why
It Is Essentialin Defending a Capital Client, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1019 (2008).
55
1 The PCR court determined that the relief Simpson sought was prohibited by state appellate rules.
It did however, note that it found "it strange that the Attorney General would trump a duly elected
Solicitor's desire as to a how a case within the Solicitor's jurisdiction should be handled." The trial
court also commented that Simpson's conduct, "while obviously self-serving, is arguably more
compassionate than the conduct of the State at this juncture in the proceedings." Order, November
13, 2002 at 3-4.
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IV. THE STORY THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT TOLD:
AN ABORTED ROBBERY BY A CAPITALLY INELIGIBLE
DEFENDANT?
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted both the Attorney General's
petition for certiorari on the sentencing phase relief granted by the PCR court and
Simpson's petition for certiorari for the denial of guilt phase relief. Thus, the
South Carolina Supreme Court had before it the new evidence relating to both the
crime scene and the man who committed the crime. In addition, it was presented
with the evidence of racial discrimination by the now-deposed Solicitor, because
racial discrimination in seeking the death penalty was presented as an alternative
ground for upholding the lower court's grant of sentencing phase relief based
upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
Then, presented with the same evidence as the PCR court, the South
Carolina Supreme Court told another story. Its certiorari-after-PCR story
differed not only from the PCR court's story, but also from the story told by the
South Carolina Supreme Court itself on direct appeal. That something had
changed is signaled in the opinion's first paragraph; for instead of describing the
crime in one sentence, as did the direct appeal opinion, a longer account is
provided. 156 Moreover, despite its greater length, the new description omits the
direct appeal's single sentence) that the killing
conclusion (contained in 5the
7
occurred during a robbery.
It turns out this omission foreshadowed the ground on which the court
granted relief. Unlike the PCR court, the higher court was seemingly
unimpressed by the new mitigation evidence. It reversed the PCR court's
decision to grant a new sentencing hearing related to the murder conviction,
concluding that trial counsel had not been derelict in failing to present available
that Simpson had not been prejudiced
mitigation evidence, and, in the alternative,
58
by any of trial counsel's omissions.1
Instead, it granted relief solely based upon the new picture of the crime
revealed at the PCR hearing. Indeed, its focus was much narrower than "the
crime"; it was completely uninterested in the evidence impeaching Simpson's
purported racial motivation, and, perhaps more surprisingly, completely
uninterested in the evidence disproving the execution-style killing. It only
partially reversed the PCR court's decision denying relief on the Brady claims,
and relied solely on the new evidence that suggested no money was taken.
According to the court, the State withheld evidence that was material with
respect to the armed robbery charge.'59 This entitled Simpson to new trial on the
armed robbery charge, but more importantly, affected his death sentence: because
robbery was the only aggravating circumstance submitted to the jury, if the jury
had not convicted Simpson of armed robbery, he would not have been deatheligible. The court therefore instructed that if, at retrial on the armed robbery

156

See Simpson v. Moore, 627 S.E.2d 701, 704-05 (S.C. 2006).

1 See id. at 705.
8

Id. at 712.
"9 Id. at 708.
11
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charge, the State were to obtain a conviction, then, but only
then, would Simpson
6
face a new sentencing hearing on the murder conviction.'
V. CONCLUSION: A FUTURE FOR KEITH SIMPSON-AND FOR JOE
HARRISON'S FAMILY
The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court put the ball back in the
new Solicitor's court. He had not changed his mind about the appropriateness of
a plea, and the victim's family had not changed their minds. Three and a half
years after the plea was originally scheduled to take place, it actually occurred.
The terms were the same as agreed upon prior to the appeal the Attorney
General's Office forced upon the Solicitor, the victim's family, and Simpson:
Simpson agreed to waive all further appeals, and both parties agreed that he
would be parole-eligible in 2022.
Simpson may or may not be paroled. His behavior in prison has been very
good, so it is certainly possible he will be. Regardless of whether he is paroled,
he has a future. With the end of litigation, Joe Harrison's family also can turn
toward the future, and maybe they can do so with just a little less bitterness than
they felt at the end of the trial. The new Solicitor's Office can put behind it the
illegal behavior of its predecessors, particularly that of one odious "investigator";
we hope it will do so with reinforced commitments to both racial neutrality and
the truth.
These good results all came from investigation, though it is still hard to say
which facts moved whom. Did the victim's family feel differently when it
learned that the execution-style killing never happened? Did it feel a little pity
for the traumatized child Keith Simpson had been? Did the new Solicitor,
looking at all the facts, decide it wasn't a "death case"? Did the PCR court really
only care about the unpresented mitigation, or was it also moved by the
misconduct of the former Solicitor? Conversely, did the South Carolina Supreme
Court care only about misconduct, and nothing about the man on trial? How is it
that no court focused on the new picture of the killing itself, which, as it turns
out, was probably not racially motivated, and definitely not execution-style.
Finally, did any decisionmaker care about the former Solicitor's
egregiously racialized seeking of death? The reader, upon hearing the conclusion
of the Simpson litigation, may wonder why this article reports the evidence of
racial motivation at all, since to all appearances, it did not convince anyone.
Nonetheless, we told the race story, both because the statistics were stark enough
to convince us, and because opinions often don't tell the whole story. Almost
every practicing lawyer has had the experience of having relief granted on one
ground, while being convinced that facts unrelated to that ground motivated the
grant of relief. This is especially so with respect to race claims; both the feelings
of shame attached to the recognition of persistent racial discrimination and the
desire to avoid acknowledging the persistence of such discrimination are often
powerful. Sometimes, the desire to avoid confronting such a claim tips the scales

'60Id. at 712.
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to favor granting relief on some less controversial claim that could have gone
either way. Indeed, one might wonder whether both the post-conviction hearing
court and the South Carolina Supreme Court were influenced, at
61 the margin, to
grant relief on claims that could easily have gone the other way.'
Likely we will never know the answers to most of these questions. We
have our own theories, but we are both experienced enough to know our theories
might be wrong. What we do know is that scarce resources-time, money, and
closure-were wasted, and that those resources might have been conserved had
the jury been given a more accurate picture of the crime and the man who
committed it. But, in Keith Simpson's case, as in so many others, the true picture
of both did not emerge until post-conviction proceedings. Unless the death
penalty is abolished-which for the first time in our professional careers seems
possible--or the criminal justice system is radically reformed to require
competent, adequately funded trial counsel and force prosecutors to disclose all
information favorable to the defense, this pattern will, like Sisyphus rolling the
rock up the hill only to see it roll down, continue to repeat itself.

161 See

Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigatingfor Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLLm.

HuM. RTs. L. REv. 178, 184-85 (2007).
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